Nuclear safeguards evaluation is a complicated issue with many missing values and uncertainties. By invoking Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, the missing values are assigned to a subset of a set of multiple objects, at the same time, by combining different evaluation values, and the effect of uncertainty will be decreased. In this way, both the missing values and uncertainties are considered in the final evaluations. This method has been used in considering the International Atomic Energy Agency experts' evaluation for nuclear safeguards. The result shows that (s 2 , 0.1897) is the biggest belief degree.
Introduction
Nowadays, nuclear system safety has attracted much attention from all over the world. Many researches have been done on nuclear power plant, 1-8 nuclear wastes, and especially nuclear weapon. Since improper use of nuclear energy may cause mass destruction, it is necessary to evaluate nuclear safeguards and limit the development of nuclear detonations. Nuclear safeguards evaluations [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] are invoked to test and verify that states meet with the international treaty, which put forward by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and make sure that those nuclear materials will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. In order to make the evaluation of indicators and then make the final assessment of the States' declarations to the institution concerning any activity which are related to nuclear power, the IAEA experts collect relevant information from some main sources: information provided by the State itself, Internet and newspapers, and nonsafeguards IAEA databases. 15 However, there still exists much uncertainty and complexity on the information they collected, and the number of indicators is huge. As a result, it is difficult for IAEA experts to conduct a comprehensive assessment of all indicators. In addition, some indicators in the assessment framework are missing values; 16 it may cause some incomplete evaluation of the security. At the same time, when we want to take those missing values into consideration, uncertainties usually come as which part these missing values should belong to. Therefore, many researchers have focused on these problems, and some methods have been put forward to handle them, such as deletion and imputation. [17] [18] [19] At the same time, Liu et al. 15 put forward a framework to deal with the information by introducing a newly belief rule. Kabak and Ruan [20] [21] [22] presented a method for estimating the cumulative belief in nuclear safeguards. Rodrı´guez et al. 16, 23 proposed to manage missing values with an imputation process by means of a collaborative filtering model 24, 25 based on the k-nearest neighbors (K-nn) scheme. Based on the hierarchical analysis and the IAEA model, Pei et al. 26 treat and handle nuclear safeguards evaluations by using a 2tuple fuzzy linguistic aggregation model 27 and weighted ordered weighted averaging (WOWA) operator. 28 In the present work, a new method for evaluating nuclear safeguards is proposed. The method is based on Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, which has been widely invoked to handle uncertain information, such as fault diagnosis, [29] [30] [31] [32] human reliability analysis, 33 pattern recognition, [34] [35] [36] [37] uncertainty modeling, [38] [39] [40] evidential reasoning, 41, 42 decision making, 43 and environmental assessment. 44, 45 In this article, first, according to the belief degrees of linguistic evaluation values given by IAEA experts and weights of IAEA experts about indicators, we obtain the basic probability assignment (BPA) of each indicator. Then, the BPA of each indicator is combined to get a general evaluation result. At the same time, some adjustments will be made on our results so that the output data can be used for other analysis. Finally, by taking the strengths of indicators into consideration, we aggregate the evaluation results of indicators and compare them with some results from other works.
Preliminaries
The IAEA physical model In order to have an accurate evaluation of nuclear energy, the IAEA proposes the physical model to consider lots of indicators in hierarchical and multilayer structure, which take all those linguistic evaluation values into account.
The values of this model are shown in Table 1 , with totally 914 indicators in it. Different levels are clear and directly address this assessment issue. At the same time, in practice, the strength of each indicator is different. Let us take a strong indicator as an example. When an indicator is connected to nuclear process or nuclear activities, it can be viewed as a strong indicator. Conversely, an indicator is weak if it is for many other reasons or for many other activities. In the process of combining indicators with different strengths during the evaluation, Liu et al. 15 put forward a rule to regulate the difference with the ratio of strong indicators:medium indicators:weak indicators being 9:3:1, which means the importance of strong indicators is nine times the importance of weak indicators.
The evaluation of nuclear safeguards is shown in Table 2 . As shown in the table
represents all the IAEA experts
which is the vector of evaluation value for each indicator I i given by IAEA expert e j . v i is the strength of indicator I i , and v i 2 v strong ( = 9), v medium ( = 3), v weak ( = 1). The weight of each IAEA expert e j about indicator I i is represented by u ij . Based on the assumption, the evaluation for the indicator I i by an expert e j will be simplified as
Here, b k ij is a value which is used to represent the belief degree associated to the linguistic term s k of indicator I i by IAEA expert e j , and s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , and s 6 represent different levels of belief degree which are equal to none, very low, low, medium, high, very high, and perfect, respectively, and they are the initial values of the evaluation.
Here, we
, it means that the information is incomplete sometimes. When it comes to the uncertainty, Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence can be used in the evaluation process.
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence
Uncertainty information has always been a hot topic, and how to deal with uncertainty is still an open issue. 46 Many mathematical methods and models have been invoked, such as fuzzy sets, 47 belief structure, 48-50 D numbers, 51-55 Z numbers, 56, 57 and so on. Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, 58, 59 as one of the widely used methods, is often used to solve uncertainty information problems. Compared with other tools, Dempster-Shafer theory can express the missing values and uncertainty by assigning a probability directly to a subset of a set of multiple objects. At the same time, the total belief of the objects will be measured separately. Due to these advantages, it has been widely used in many areas, such as information fusion, 60,61 game theory, 62 decision making, 54, 63, 64 and risk and reliability analysis. 65, 66 To complete the description, we introduce some basic concepts in the following parts.
Let O be a set of mutually exclusive and collectively detailed events, indicated by
where O is called a frame of discernment, and N is the number of events. The power set of O is indicated by 2 O , namely
The elements of 2 O or subset of O are called propositions.
When it comes to a frame of discernment O = fE 1 , E 2 , . . . , E N g, a mass function is defined as a mapping m from 2 O to ½0, 1, formally defined by
which satisfies the following condition
In the theory of Dempster-Shafer, a mass function is usually defined as a BPA of the frame of discernment O. The assigned probability m(A) is the belief exactly assigned to A and can be used to represent the strength of the evidence which supports A. If m(A).0, A is called a focal element, and the union of all focal elements is called the core of the mass function, which is the most important concept in evidence theory and many operations about this function, for example, divergence measure [67] [68] [69] and negation. 70, 71 Taking two pieces of evidence into consideration, they can be indicated by two BPAs, m 1 and m 2 , with Dempster's rule of combination used to combine them.
With two belief structures m 1 and m 2 , the Dempster's rule of combination, denoted by m = m 1 È m 2 , is defined as follows
where K is a normalization constant called the collision coefficient of two BPAs. Dempster's combination rule can be seen as one of the most important and widely used parts of Dempster-Shafer theory, and it also satisfies the exchange and association properties. Therefore, if there exist multiple belief structures, the calculation of their combination results can be performed in pairs or in any order. When we talk about the Dempster-Shafer theory, how to manage the conflict evidence is of great importance. [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] In addition, for the purpose of facilitating decision making, many methods have been developed to do the transformation or directly convert belief structures into probability distributions. For example, the pianistic transformation 77 and plausibility transformation 78 are two well-known methods. 
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency.
Method
A new method is proposed in this section to evaluate the nuclear safeguards, which is based on Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, and the details about this method will also be provided. Also, the belief degree 79, 80 to aggregate the values of Table 2 is proposed.
Step 1:
, it means there exist some missing values and these missing values are hard to assign, which may bring some uncertainties.
For each evaluation given by IAEA expert, the corresponding weight will be multiplied. a ij is defined as the normalized weighting factor that each expert has compared with all the experts. Then, j ij = a ij 3 b ij .
Then a new evaluation is constructed as follows
Step 2: BPAs are constructed by assigning the missing values and uncertainty to the subsets of the set composed of multiple objects. In our case, the set is constructed as (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 ), which is reasonable considering the existence of uncertainty.
Here, it can be easily seen that P 6 n = 0 j n ij \1. Then, the results of modified BPAs are shown as follows
Here, 1 -S represents evaluation value of the missing information and the uncertainty.
Step 3: If there are n IAEA experts making their evaluations on each indicator, we would have n BPAs on each indicator.
Using the combination rule of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence to aggregate the evaluation experts made on each indicator, composite evaluation on each indicator can be obtained
Step 4: Based on the strength of an indicator, the indicators are divided into three classes-the strong indicators, the medium indicators, and the weak indicators. They should be considered independently to get the corresponding evaluation results. Then, we combine them, respectively, under the rule of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence and the results are noted as
where S s = P 6 n = 0 b n s , S m = P 6 n = 0 b n m , and S w = P 6 n = 0 b n w .
Step 5: Following step 4, the combination results of strong indicators, medium indicators, and weak indicators will be calculated, and the final results can be achieved on the basis of the three individual classes. We continue to combine them by using the combination rule of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence whose results needed to be aggregated. Because of the different weights of three kinds of indicators, which is v strong (= 9), v medium (= 3), v weak (= 1), we multiply M s , M m , and M w with the normalized corresponding weights. Hence, the modified M Ã s , M Ã m , and M Ã w are obtained.
Finally, M Ã s , M Ã m , and M Ã w are combined to get the final results. In this method, although there may exist uncertainty in the evaluations, some adjustments are made so that the combination rule of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence can be used to combine the evaluations. Even when there exist missing values in the evaluation, by assigning the missing values to a new element, the missing values will be taken into consideration and the uncertainties can be effectively reduced.
Application
In this section, we illustrate an example to demonstrate how our method works and show the advantages of it by comparing with other works. The example is based on the gaseous diffusion enrichment process, which consists of 22 indicators, shown in Table 3 . 21 It is a general assumption that each IAEA expert has the same weight for any indicator, which means in this example, for any i, u i1 = 3, u i2 = 5, u i3 = 4, and u i4 = 2.
Values of the evaluation for the 22 indicators are shown in Table 4 . 21 For I 2 , it can be obtained that Therefore, the belief degree of indicator I 2 can be calculated as Then, the evaluation of all indicators and the results are shown in Table 5 .
The indicators are of the same values, and there are 3 strong indicators, 7 medium indicators, and 12 weak indicators. Hence, the aggregations of three kinds of indicators will be computed, respectively, according to the combination rule of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, noted as M s , M m , and M w , shown in Table 6 . Chlorine trifluoride Medium I 10 Nickel powder, high purity Medium I 11 Gasket, large Weak I 12 Feed system/product and tails withdrawal Weak I 13 Expansion bellows Weak I 14
Header piping system Weak I 15 Vacuum system and pump Weak I 16 Aluminum oxide powder Weak I 17 Nickel powder Weak I 18 Polytetrafluoroethylene (Teflon) Weak I 19 Large electrical switching yard Weak I 20 Large heat increase in air or water Weak I 21 Larger specific power consumption Weak I 22 Larger cooling requirements (towers) Weak I 1 (0, 0, 0, 0:7, 0:3, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:3, 0:2, 0:5) I 2 (0, 0:8, 0:2, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0:1, 0:6, 0:2, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) I 3 (0, 0, 0:6, 0:4, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0:2, 0:5, 0:3, 0) ( 0, 0, 0:4, 0:6, 0, 0, 0) I 4 (0, 0, 0, 0:7, 0:3, 0, 0) 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 À Á (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:9, 0:1) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:8, 0:2, 0) I 5 (0, 0, 0, 0:7, 0:3, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 , 1 7 À Á (0, 0, 0:1, 0, 0, 0:1, 0:9) I 6 (0, 0, 0, 0:1, 0:9, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:2, 0:6, 0:2) ( 0, 0, 0:1, 0:8, 0:1, 0, 0) I 7 (0, 0, 0:6, 0:4, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:2, 0:7, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:9, 0:1) I 8 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:3, 0:7) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:4, 0:6, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:3, 0:4, 0:1) I 9 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:3, 0:6, 0:1) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:7, 0:3, 0) I 10 (0, 0:2, 0:8, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0:2, 0:5, 0:3, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:7, 0:3, 0) I 11 (0, 0, 0:8, 0:2, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:9, 0:1) ( 0, 0, 0:2, 0:6, 0:2, 0, 0) I 12 (0:1, 0:9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0:8, 0:1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0:1, 0:9, 0, 0) I 13 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:4, 0:6) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:1, 0:7, 0:1) I 14 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:1, 0:9) ( 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:9) ( 0, 0, 0, 0:3, 0:5, 0:2, 0) I 15 (0, 0, 0, 0:7, 0:3, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0:9, 0:1, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) I 16 (0, 0:2, 0:8, 0, 0, 0, 0) À Á (0, 0:4, 0:5, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0:9, 0:1, 0, 0) I 17 (0, 0, 0, 0:1, 0:9, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:9, 0:1, 0) I 18 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0:2, 0:6, 0:2, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0:8, 0:2, 0, 0, 0) I 19 (0, 0, 0:3, 0:7, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:8, 0:1) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:1, 0:8, 0) I 20 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:3, 0:7)
( 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:6, 0:4, 0) I 21 (0, 0, 0, 0:4, 0:6, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:1, 0:8, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:4, 0:6) I 22 (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ( 0:1, 0:8, 0:1, 0, 0, 0, 0) Therefore, 0.1897, which is (s 2 , 0.1897), is the biggest belief degree of the final evaluation and here 0.3745 is the value of uncertainty. To compare with other methods, we list the results of their methods, and they are shown in Table 7 . 21 In Liu et al.'s 15 method, although it takes into account the strengths of indicators, it does not consider the degree of belief in the value of linguistic evaluation, the weight of IAEA experts, and the ''missing value in nuclear safeguards evaluation.'' In Kabak and Ruan's 21 method, despite the degree of belief that the indicator k at s i level is a weighted sum of expert beliefs, the linguistic evaluations are not taken into consideration in the aggregation. Pei et al. 26 truly take the missing information and conflict information into consideration, but the uncertainty is still a problem that needed to be solved. In a word, Liu's method, Kabak's method, and Pei's method all have some weaknesses. Based on the advantages of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, our method can handle uncertainty information and missing values more efficiently by assigning the probability to the subsets of the set composed of multiple objects. At the same time, our approach rationally takes into account the information on the indicators and the weighting factors. In the final evaluation part, our result can not only provide the value of s i but also give the value of uncertainty. Thus, our method has a better performance in managing missing values and uncertainties in nuclear safeguards assessments.
Conclusion
Decreasing the effect of uncertainty and missing values is critical for nuclear evaluation. Because nuclear safeguards information may be incomplete and there are various uncertainties in nuclear safeguards assessment, this article deals with these uncertainties and missing values by assigning probabilities to a subset of a set of multiple objects and in this way the uncertainty and missing information will both be taken into the evaluation process. In the proposed method, Dempster-Shafer evidence theory is invoked to express uncertainty and missing values. At the same time, the weighting factors of the indicators and experts who took part in the evaluation process have been made full use of. As a result, our method can handle the missing values and the uncertainty better than other methods, and the limitations of it are much less than other methods. The results prove that it is of great importance to consider uncertainty and missing information.
